KRS CHAPTER 512 CRIMINAL DAMAGE To PROPERTY

 

TITLE L – KENTUCKY PENAL CODE

KRS ANNOTATED

KRS Chapter 512 Criminal Damage To Property

KRS 512.010  Thru  KRS 512.080

KRS 512.010 Definitions for chapter

KRS 512.020 Criminal mischief in the first degree

KRS 512.030 Criminal mischief in the second degree

KRS 512.040 Criminal mischief in the third degree

KRS 512.050 Criminal use of noxious substance

KRS 512.060 Criminal possession of noxious substance

KRS 512.070 Criminal littering 

KRS 512.070 Criminal littering. — Local governments may classify criminal littering as civil offenses. (Effective January 1, 2013)

KRS 512.080 Unlawfully posting advertisements

KRS512.090 Unlawful acts relating to acquiring metals.

 

Updated 08/13/2013 (2013) GB

 
 
 

KRS 512.010 Definitions for chapter.

The following definitions apply in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Litter" means rubbish, refuse, waste material, offal, paper, glass, cans, bottles, trash, debris or any foreign substance of whatever kind or description and whether or not it is of value.

(2) "Noxious substance" means any substance capable of generating offensive, noxious or suffocating fumes, gases or vapors.

(3) "Property" includes cattle.

Effective: July 13, 2004  History: Amended 2004 Ky. Acts ch. 141, sec. 3, effective July 13, 2004. – Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 105, effective January 1, 1975.
 

NO ANNOTATION FOR THIS STATUTE:

 
 

KRS 512.020 Criminal mischief in the first degree.

(1) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he intentionally or wantonly defaces, destroys or damages any property causing pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more.

(2) Criminal mischief in the first degree is a Class D felony.

Effective: January 1, 1975  History: Amended 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 183, sec. 3. — Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 106, effective January 1, 1975.
 
ANNOTATION FOR THIS STATUTE:
 

[U] Thomas v. Commonwealth (Ky., 2013)   2011-SC-000042-MR February 21, 2013 MODIFIED: FEBRUARY 21, 2013

Criminal mischief is not a lesser-included offense of arson. The offense does not fit within the statutory requirements for a lesser-included offense  because it requires proof of more facts, rather than the "same or less." The elements of criminal mischief are "intentionally or wantonly defacing, destroying, or damaging any property causing pecuniary loss" of at least $1,000 or $500, depending on degree. *11  First-degree arson requires a person to intend to "destroy or damage a building" by starting a fire or causing an explosion.  And the building must be inhabited or occupied, or the person must have reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied, or any other person sustains serious physical injury as a result of the fire or explosion.

It is clear that criminal mischief requires proof of an element that first-degree arson does not. There is a valuation element in criminal mischief that is absent from first-degree arson. As a result, criminal mischief has a wholly individual element and cannot be a lesser-included offense of first-degree arson. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we find no error in its ruling.

11. See KRS 512.020; KRS 512.030.  

 

Fagan v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 274 (Ky., 2012)   August 23, 2012

 

Summaries: Source: Justia


A jury convicted Defendant of theft by unlawful taking over $10,000 and three counts of first-degree criminal mischief. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twenty years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence but vacated the trial court’s amended judgment and remanded to the trial court to reinstate the final judgment as originally entered, holding (1) Defendant’s convictions did not violate double jeopardy; (2) the trial court did not err by ordering Defendant to pay restitution that exceeded $100,000 because the $100,000 statutory cap was not applicable to the trial court’s restitution order; but (3) the trial court lacked authority to amend the final judgment more than ten days after its entry.

 

  A person is guilty of first-degree criminal mischief when (1) having no right to do so (or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right) (2) he intentionally or wantonly (3) defaces, destroys, or damages any property (4) causing pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more.*10

Applying the Blockburger test, theft by unlawful taking over $10,000 requires intent to deprive the owner of the property; but first-degree criminal mischief does not. And first-degree criminal mischief requires the property be defaced, destroyed, or damaged; but theft by unlawful taking over $10,000 does not. So each statute requires proof of a fact that the other does not.

Fn 10 .KRS 512.020(1).  
 
  

Deberry v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-000286-MR (Ky. App. 4/16/2010) (Ky. App., 2010)

 Further, Deberry did not present sufficient evidence to warrant a defense of property instruction. In order to justify the use of deadly force to protect his camera, Deberry must have shown that Ferguson was "[c]ommitting or attempting to commit a burglary, robbery, or other felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055[.]" A protection of property defense may have been applicable to this case if Deberry had established that he acted to protect his camera from felonious criminal mischief.

KRS 512.020(1) provides the following description of criminal mischief:

A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such a right, he intentionally or wantonly defaces, destroys or damages any property causing a pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more.

        Deberry bore the burden of proving the elements of his affirmative defense. Our review of the record indicates that Deberry failed to present any evidence of the camera’s value or perceived value. Because he failed to establish that his actions were used against someone committing a felony involving the use of force, a protection of property instruction was not warranted.

 

Bratcher v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-SC-000151-MR (Ky. 1/21/2010) (Ky., 2010)

      Id. at 187. The crime of first-degree criminal mischief is found in KRS 512.020, which states, "A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he intentionally or wantonly defaces, destroys or damages any property causing pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more."

        For both counts of first-degree criminal mischief, one dealing with the damage to the Balls’ house and the other dealing with damage to the Mercedes-Benz, the jury instructions charged Appellant as the principal actor and not as an accomplice acting with his co-defendants. Therefore, Appellant argues that he should have been granted a directed verdict because while the Commonwealth produced evidence of the overall amount of damage done to the house and Mercedez-Benz, the Commonwealth never proved that Appellant personally caused $1000 of damage as required by KRS 512.020. As we stated previously in Terry v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 466, 471-472 (Ky. 2007), "[t]he $1,000 minimum property damage requirement must be considered an actual element of the offense of first-degree criminal mischief because, in order to avoid a directed verdict on that charge, the Commonwealth must show that a defendant . . . caused at least $1,000 in property damage." We agree.

 

Lennox v. Commonwealth, No. 2008-CA-000690-MR (Ky. App. 5/22/2009) (Ky. App., 2009)

    "A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he intentionally or wantonly defaces, destroys or damages any property causing pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more." Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 512.020(1). Appellant claims that the Commonwealth did not prove the monetary element of the offense; that there was no proof Appellant caused a loss of $1,000 or more.

        Appellant draws our attention to the evidence the Commonwealth used to prove the amount of the loss. Specifically, that Boone testified the machine was three-years old, that it cost over $1,000 when he bought it, that the machine could not be fixed, that it was replaced with a new machine costing approximately $1,800, that a welder had to be hired to install the machine, and that the total amount of damage of $2,450 did not meet his insurance deductible. Put succinctly, Appellant argues that there was no evidence of the fair market value of the coin machine at the time it was destroyed and therefore no proof he caused $1,000 or more of damage.

        We disagree. The evidence was sufficient to survive a motion for directed verdict. Based on the evidence above, a jury could reasonably infer that the machine was worth at least $1,000 at the time it was destroyed. The machine was just three-years old, in good working condition, and the new machine cost around $1,800. Additionally, the labor costs of the welder in installing the replacement machine are included in the $1,000 threshold. See Brown v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 671 (Ky. App. 2007). Based on this evidence, it was reasonable for a jury to find Appellant guilty.

 

Com. v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665 (Ky., 2009)

  A person is guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon when he possesses … a firearm when he has been convicted of a felony, as defined by the laws of the jurisdiction in which he was convicted, in any state or federal court and has not:

(a) Been granted a full pardon by the Governor or by the President of the United States;

(b) Been granted relief by the United States Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended.

       KRS 527.040(1). "Firearm," for the purposes of this statute, "means any weapon which will expel a projectile by the action of an explosive." KRS 527.010(4). At trial, the Commonwealth established that in 1995 Jones was convicted of first-degree criminal mischief, a class-D felony (KRS 512.020), and that in April 2003 he pawned a Ruger .22 caliber rifle at a Mt. Sterling pawn shop. Jones testified in his defense and admitted pawning the rifle for $80.00, but claimed that he was under the impression that his 1995 conviction had been for a misdemeanor and thus did not bar his possession of the gun. There was no testimony concerning whether the rifle could be fired, and the jury instructions, which closely followed the pattern instruction in Cooper and Cetrulo, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, § 8.605th ed. (2006), neither defined the term "firearm" nor required a finding that the rifle was operational. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if Jones had not properly preserved the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue at trial, the lack of proof that the rifle was a working "firearm" for statutory purposes rendered his conviction manifestly unjust and subject to review under RCr 10.26 for palpable error. The Commonwealth [283 S.W.3d 668] challenges that result on several grounds.

    Nevertheless, for a reason not addressed by the parties but dispositive of this appeal, we disagree with the Court of Appeals that an error occurred. The Court of Appeals held that KRS 527.010(4) required the Commonwealth to prove the rifle’s operability, but in Campbell v. Commonwealth, 260 S.W.3d 792 (Ky.2008), we recently held that the KRS 527.010(4) definition of "firearm" incorporates the pre-penal code presumption that guns work. See Mosely v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.2d 492 (Ky.1964) (holding that inoperability of gun was an affirmative defense); Arnold v. Commonwealth, 109 S.W.3d 161, 163 (Ky. App.2003) (in carrying concealed deadly weapons case, inoperability of the weapon is an affirmative defense for which defense has burden of proof). In short, the Commonwealth does not have the burden of proving firearm operability but rather the [283 S.W.3d 671] defense may raise inoperability as an affirmative defense. 260 S.W.3d at 803-04. Proof of operability, therefore, or jury instructions requiring a finding that a firearm actually works are not necessary unless there is non-speculative evidence at trial which calls the presumption into reasonable doubt. Here, the rifle Jones pawned was presumptively functional, and because there was no evidence calling that presumption into question (indeed Jones’s testimony acknowledging his pawning of the rifle tended to enforce the presumption), the Commonwealth was not otherwise obliged to establish that the rifle worked. The trial court did not err, therefore, palpably or otherwise, by denying Jones’s motions for a directed verdict or by excluding the operability question from the jury instructions.

        In sum, because Jones’s conviction was not tainted by a palpable error, we reverse the August 4, 2006 Opinion of the Court of Appeals, and hereby reinstate the April 26, 2004 Judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court.

 

Crain v. Com., 257 S.W.3d 924 (Ky., 2008)

    Appellant, Tony R. Crain, was convicted of several crimes, including first-degree criminal mischief and first-degree fleeing or evading, stemming from his running from the police in his car. He raises two claims of error on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict on charges of first- and second-degree criminal mischief; and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a lesser-included instruction on the charge of first-degree fleeing or evading police. The first claim presents the Court with two issues of first impression, namely what constitutes a "pecuniary loss" as used in the criminal mischief statutes (KRS 512.020, 512.030, and 512.040), and whether property damage that a defendant’s insurance company pays for should be regarded as a "loss" for purposes of those statutes.

      Looking to the briefs, Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. KRS 512.020 states that the person is guilty if he "wantonly … destroys or damages any property causing pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more." (Emphasis added.) The statute has no requirement that the pecuniary loss be borne by the victim’s bank account, only that the defendant cause a loss. And as the Commonwealth points out, the insurance company has paid over $6,000 for repairs to Mr. Bruce’s truck.

    Based upon the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

 

Terry v. Com., 253 S.W.3d 466 (Ky., 2007)

    Criminal mischief in the first degree is denounced in KRS 512.020(1): "A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he intentionally or wantonly defaces, destroys or damages any property causing pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more." The basic element of the crime, indeed of all degrees of criminal mischief, is intentional or wanton damage to property.2 The statute makes no distinction among types or kinds of property. First-degree criminal mischief is a Class D felony. KRS 512.020(2).

     For the foregoing reasons, Terry’s convictions for criminal mischief in the first degree are vacated and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Terry’s convictions for desecration of venerated objects in the first degree, violating a grave, theft by unlawful taking over $300, and abuse of a corpse are affirmed.

 

Brown v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-000545-MR (Ky. App. 8/10/2007) (Ky. App., 2007)

  It is well-established that interpretation and construction of a statute is a matter of law for the court. City of Worthington Hills v. Worthington Fire Protection District, 140 S.W.3d 584 (Ky.App. 2004). KRS 512.020 clearly requires proof of damage to property in the amount of at least $1,000.00 in order to sustain a conviction upon first-degree criminal mischief. In so doing, KRS 512.020 specifically utilizes the term "pecuniary loss." When defining a term in a statute, we are bound to give such term its ordinary meaning. KRS 446.080(4). Pecuniary loss is generally defined as "[a] loss of money or of something having monetary value." Black’s Law Dictionary 1152 (7th ed. 1999). We believe that the cost of labor to install the convertible top is "something having monetary value." Accordingly, we conclude that the cost of labor represents a proper element of pecuniary loss under KRS 512.020. As such, we reject appellant’s contention that the circuit court erred by considering the cost of labor for installing the convertible top as a pecuniary loss under KRS 512.020. Thus, appellant was not denied due process upon the court denying his motion for a directed verdict.

 

Stout v. Com., 33 S.W.3d 531 (Ky. App., 2000)

 Kevin Stout appeals his conviction on charges of first-degree burglary (KRS 511.020), first-degree criminal mischief (KRS 512.020), theft by unlawful taking over $300 (KRS 514.030), and possession of burglar’s tools (KRS 511.050). He was sentenced to a total of twelve years’ imprisonment. Stout presents only one issue on appeal — whether or not a utility knife is a deadly weapon. We affirm

Stout contends that the item found in his possession is not a knife or a razor but rather a common tool used by carpet layers, carpenters, delivery persons, etc. The trial court, on Stout’s motion for a directed verdict, held otherwise

     In Williams v. Commonwealth, Ky., 304 Ky. 761, 202 S.W.2d 408 (1947), the Court held a razor to be a deadly weapon when it stated:

        "Counsel’s contention that a razor could not come within the scope and purview of this law, though confessedly a most deadly weapon, because it was designed for a lawful purpose, is not well taken. When and while used, or intended for use, as an article of the toilet, it is not, nor need not be, concealed, but the man who carries it upon his person hidden from the public view, arms himself with a weapon deadly in its nature and merciless in its power to do harm, and is, in our opinion, as guilty of a violation of the law as he who so carries the pistol, dirk or the sling-shot."

 

Graves v. Com., 17 S.W.3d 858 (Ky., 2000)  

 Graves claims he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal of the charge of first-degree criminal mischief, because the Commonwealth failed to prove that the McDonald vehicle was worth at least $1,000.00. KRS 512.020. However, Graves’s motion for a directed verdict was only on "all charges" and not specifically on the criminal mischief charge. Nor did he object to the instruction on criminal mischief. When there are multiple counts, the proper procedure for challenging the sufficiency of evidence on one particular count is to object to the giving of an instruction on that count. Seay v. Commonwealth, Ky., 609 S.W.2d 128 (1980); Kimbrough v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 525 (1977).

 
 
KRS 512.030 Criminal mischief in the second degree.

(1) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the second degree when, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he intentionally or wantonly defaces, destroys or damages any property causing pecuniary loss of $500 or more.

(2) Criminal mischief in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.

Effective: January 1, 1975 History: Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 107, effective January 1, 1975.
 
ANNOTATION FOR THIS STATUTE:
 

[U] Thomas v. Commonwealth (Ky., 2013)   2011-SC-000042-MR February 21, 2013 MODIFIED: FEBRUARY 21, 2013

Criminal mischief is not a lesser-included offense of arson. The offense does not fit within the statutory requirements for a lesser-included offense  because it requires proof of more facts, rather than the "same or less." The elements of criminal mischief are "intentionally or wantonly defacing, destroying, or damaging any property causing pecuniary loss" of at least $1,000 or $500, depending on degree. *11 First-degree arson requires a person to intend to "destroy or damage a building" by starting a fire or causing an explosion.  And the building must be inhabited or occupied, or the person must have reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied, or any other person sustains serious physical injury as a result of the fire or explosion.

It is clear that criminal mischief requires proof of an element that first-degree arson does not. There is a valuation element in criminal mischief that is absent from first-degree arson. As a result, criminal mischief has a wholly individual element and cannot be a lesser-included offense of first-degree arson. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we find no error in its ruling.

11. See KRS 512.020; KRS 512.030.  

 

Lindsey v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-002189-MR (Ky. App. 1/4/2008) (Ky. App., 2008)    

     KRS 512.030(1) provides that "[a] person is guilty of criminal mischief in the second degree when, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he intentionally or wantonly defaces, destroys or damages any property causing pecuniary loss of $500 or more." Lindsey alleges that the shop owner testified and documented that he had to expend only $475.00 to repair the damage caused by the break-in, and, therefore, the pecuniary loss suffered fell below the $500.00 threshold required for conviction of complicity to commit criminal mischief in the second-degree.

        When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, the trial court is required to consider all evidence presented in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.1991). On appeal, the standard of review is whether or not it was clearly unreasonable for the fact-finder to find guilt. Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky.1983).

        While it is true that the shop owner testified that he had to expend only $475.00 to have the break-in damage repaired, he also testified to the effect that he had to bring in several employees to help clean up the mess left in the store after the burglary, and that when the clean-up costs were taken into account, the total damage was over $500.00.

        Given that the documented cost of repairing the break-in damage alone was $475.00, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, once clean-up costs are considered, it was not clearly unreasonable for the jury to find that the total pecuniary loss was $500.00 or more.

 

Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Clay, 601 S.W.2d 287 (Ky., 1980)

    Respondent and his wife had serious difficulties which resulted in a dissolution of their marriage. Subsequent conduct of the respondent resulted in his being charged by his former wife with criminal mischief (KRS 512.040), a Class B misdemeanor, assault in the third degree (KRS 508.030), a Class A misdemeanor, and terroristic threatening (KRS 508.080), a Class A misdemeanor. Respondent denied any guilt; however, on trial he was found guilty of all three offenses and sentenced to serve sixty (60) days in jail on each offense, all to run concurrently and all suspended for a period of two years. He also was fined $250 on the assault charge.

     Pursuant to the provisions of SCR 3.370(8), the court adopts the decision of the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association relating to all matters in issue in this case, and respondent is hereby publicly reprimanded

 
 
 
KRS 512.040 Criminal mischief in the third degree.

(1) A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the third degree when:

(a) Having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he intentionally or wantonly defaces, destroys or damages any property; or

(b) He tampers with property so as knowingly to endanger the person or property of another.

(2) Criminal mischief in the third degree is a Class B misdemeanor.

Effective: June 19, 1976  History: Amended 1976 Ky. Acts ch. 183, sec. 4, effective June 19, 1976. – Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 108, effective January 1, 1975.
 
ANNOTATION FOR THIS STATUTE:
 

 [U] Hill v. Commonwealth (Ky. App., 2012)    2011-CA-002099-MR  December 21, 2012

Hill and three other co-defendants were indicted by the Fayette County grand jury on December 1, 2009, in a thirteen-count indictment. Hill was charged with eleven of the thirteen counts, which arose from incidents that took place on September 9 and September 30, 2009. He was charged with two counts of first-degree burglary pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 511.020; three counts of first-degree robbery pursuant to KRS 515.020; first-degree rape pursuant to KRS 510.040; first-degree wanton endangerment pursuant to KRS 508.060; second-degree fleeing and evading police pursuant to KRS 502.100; two counts of third-degree criminal mischief pursuant to KRS 512.040; and for being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun pursuant to KRS 527.040. The September 3rd incidents involved break-ins at the residences of Hispanic families and the sexual assault of a female in one of the homes. The September 30th charges arose from Hill’s actions during his apprehension by detectives from the Lexington Police Department. Hill was found to be indigent, and the court appointed a public defender to represent him.

 

Terry v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-SC-000749-MR (Ky. 12/20/2007) (Ky., 2007)

Although the precise issue is not before us, Terry’s double jeopardy argument might have been valid if he had been charged with third-degree criminal mischief (KRS 512.040) since that offense does not require the Commonwealth to prove that a defendant committed a threshold monetary amount of property damage. See Timothy K., 27 P.3d at 1265 n.5.

 

Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Clay, 601 S.W.2d 287 (Ky., 1980)

    Respondent and his wife had serious difficulties which resulted in a dissolution of their marriage. Subsequent conduct of the respondent resulted in his being charged by his former wife with criminal mischief (KRS 512.040), a Class B misdemeanor, assault in the third degree (KRS 508.030), a Class A misdemeanor, and terroristic threatening (KRS 508.080), a Class A misdemeanor. Respondent denied any guilt; however, on trial he was found guilty of all three offenses and sentenced to serve sixty (60) days in jail on each offense, all to run concurrently and all suspended for a period of two years. He also was fined $250 on the assault charge.

     Pursuant to the provisions of SCR 3.370(8), the court adopts the decision of the Board of Governors of the Kentucky Bar Association relating to all matters in issue in this case, and respondent is hereby publicly reprimanded

 

Harris v. Commonwealth (Ky. App., 2003)

     Next, appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence of criminal mischief in the third degree when she kicked the windows in the police cruiser. Appellant argues that no evidence was presented that she defaced, destroyed or damaged the property, as required by KRS 512.040.

        The evidence presented at trial consisted of an officer’s testimony that appellant kicked at the window in the cruiser and pushed the window out of the track. We agree with the Commonwealth that testimonial evidence was sufficient to prove that the window was damaged without having to provide a photograph of the window. We also do not believe that the Commonwealth had to establish what was required to repair the window. The statute for criminal mischief in the third degree, KRS 512.040, only requires the Commonwealth to show that property was damaged, not the extent or cost of it. We believe the evidence was sufficient to convince a reasonable juror that appellant was guilty of criminal mischief in the third degree. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the directed verdict.

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s convictions in the McCracken Circuit Court.

 

Evans v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-000072-MR (Ky. App. 4/20/2007) (Ky. App., 2007)

Appellant was subsequently indicted for assault in the second degree (KRS 508.020), burglary in the first degree (KRS 511.020), and criminal mischief in the third degree (KRS 512.040)(Indictment No. 01-CR-00232). Appellant ultimately entered a plea of guilty.2 On June 21, 2002, a Judgment and Order Imposing Sentence was entered and appellant was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment probated for a period of five years.

  As such, the circuit court’s December 5, 2005, order revoking appellant’s probation is reversed. Upon remand, the court is directed to enter an order sentencing appellant to a term of imprisonment that when combined with the one-year sentence previously imposed does not exceed the original seven-year sentence.

        For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Hardin Circuit Court is reversed and this cause remanded for proceeding not inconsistent with this opinion.

 
 
KRS 512.050 Criminal use of noxious substance.

(1) A person is guilty of criminal use of a noxious substance when he unlawfully deposits on the land or in the building or vehicle of another any stink bomb, device, or irritant with the intent to interfere with another’s use of the land, building or vehicle.

(2) Criminal use of a noxious substance is a Class B misdemeanor.

Effective: January 1, 1975

History: 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 109, effective January 1, 1975.

 

NO ANNOTATION FOR THIS STATUTE:

 
 
KRS 512.060 Criminal possession of noxious substance.

(1) A person is guilty of criminal possession of a noxious substance when he possesses such substance under circumstances evincing an intent unlawfully to use or cause it to be used to inflict injury upon or to cause annoyance to a person, or to damage property of another, or to disturb the public peace.

(2) Criminal possession of a noxious substance is a Class B misdemeanor.

Effective: January 1, 1975

History: Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 110, effective January 1, 1975.

 

NO ANNOTATION FOR THIS STATUTE:

 
 

KRS 512.070 Criminal littering.  (Effective until January 1, 2013)

(1) A person is guilty of criminal littering when he:

(a) Drops or permits to drop on a highway any destructive or injurious material and does not immediately remove it; or

(b) Knowingly places or throws litter on any public or private property or in any public or private water without permission; or

(c) Negligently places or throws glass or other dangerous pointed or edged substances on or adjacent to water to which the public has access for swimming or wading or on or within fifty (50) feet of a public highway; or

(d) Discharges sewage, minerals, oil products, or litter into any public waters or lakes within the state.

(2) Criminal littering is a Class A misdemeanor.

(3) Violators may prepay to the Circuit Court clerk if prepayment is so noted on the citation and if the littering offense is not combined with an offense that is not prepayable.

Effective: July 15, 2002 History: Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 342, sec. 10, effective July 15, 2002. – Amended 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 145, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1982. — Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 111, effective January 1, 1975.
 
 

KRS 512.070 Criminal littering. — Local governments may classify criminal littering as civil offenses. (Effective January 1, 2013)

(1) A person is guilty of criminal littering when he:

(a) Drops or permits to drop on a highway any destructive or injurious material and does not immediately remove it; or

(b) Knowingly places or throws litter on any public or private property or in any public or private water without permission; or

(c) Negligently places or throws glass or other dangerous pointed or edged substances on or adjacent to water to which the public has access for swimming or wading or on or within fifty (50) feet of a public highway; or

(d) Discharges sewage, minerals, oil products, or litter into any public waters or lakes within the state.

(2) Criminal littering is a Class A misdemeanor.

(3) Violators may prepay to the Circuit Court clerk if prepayment is so noted on the citation and if the littering offense is not combined with an offense that is not prepayable.

(4) Notwithstanding any language or provision of this section or KRS 65.8808(3) to the contrary, the legislative body of a local government may, by ordinance, choose to classify the offenses proscribed in subsection (1) of this section as civil offenses in accordance with KRS 65.8808.

Effective: January 1, 2013  History: Amended 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 63, sec. 9, effective January 1, 2013. — Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 342, sec. 10, effective July 15, 2002. — Amended 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 145, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1982. — Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 111, effective January 1, 1975.

 

NO ANNOTATION FOR THIS STATUTE:

 
 
KRS 512.080 Unlawfully posting advertisements.

(1) A person is guilty of unlawfully posting advertisements when, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe he has such a right, he posts, paints or otherwise affixes to the property of another person or to public property any advertisement, poster, notice or other matter.

(2) Unlawfully posting advertisements is a violation.

Effective: January 1, 1975

History: Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 112, effective January 1, 1975.

 

NO ANNOTATION FOR THIS STATUTE:

 
 

KRS 512.090 Unlawful acts relating to acquiring metals. (Effective July 12, 2012)

(1) A person is guilty of unlawful acts relating to acquiring metals when the person intentionally and without permission cuts, mutilates, defaces, or otherwise injures any personal or real property of another, including any fixtures or improvements, for the purpose of obtaining any restricted metal, nonferrous metal, or ferrous metal as defined in KRS 433.900, in any amount.

(2) Unlawful acts relating to acquiring metals is:

(a) A Class B misdemeanor with a fine of not more than two hundred fifty dollars ($250) or imprisonment in the county jail for less than ninety (90) days, or both, if the direct injury to the property, the amount of loss in value to the property, the amount of repairs necessary to return the property to its condition before the act, or the property loss, including fixtures or improvements, is less than three thousand dollars ($3,000); or

(b) A Class D felony with a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or double his or her gain from commission of the offense, whichever is the greater, or imprisonment for not less than one (1) year but not more than five (5) years, or both, if the direct injury to the property, the amount of loss in value to the property, the amount of repairs necessary to return the property to its condition before the act, or the property loss, including fixtures or improvements, is three thousand dollars ($3,000) or more.

Effective: July 12, 2012  History: Created 2012 Ky. Acts ch. 91, sec. 5, effective July 12, 2012.

 

 

 
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